My dissertation Defeasibility in Epistemology (2020) explored ways in which logics for defeasible reasoning can be used to further contemporary debates in epistemology. I like to think of it as an exercise in non-traditional formal epistemology and as keeping John Pollock‘s legacy alive. If you’re interested, you can take a look at a summary or read the whole thing. However, the dissertation has been superseded by a set of standalone papers, and so you might prefer to read them instead.

Chapters 1–2:

Epistemic conflicts and the form of epistemic rules, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105(2) (2024), 158–90.

Chapter 3:

Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic, Ergo 8(6) (2021), 141–74.

Chapters 4–6:

Conciliatory views, higher-order disagreements, and defeasible logic, Synthese 200(2), 173 (2022), 1–23.

Conciliatory reasoning, self-defeat, and abstract argumentation, The Review of Symbolic Logic 16(3) (2023), 740–87.