A paper on mixed views on epistemic rules / moral principles
In previous work, I explored the connections between two types of views on epistemic rules, such as “If you perceive that X, then you ought to believe that X“. According to the first, such rules have hedges. According to the second, they are contributory. I’m currently working on a follow-up paper that focuses more on ethical principles than epistemic rules and explores what I call mixed views on rules / principles, that is, views on which rules / principles are contributory, but can also have hedges.
A paper on normativity and logic of structural rationality
This paper explores how formal tools can be applied in the context of the debate about the normativity of rationality or, roughly, the quest of explaining what’s wrong with having incoherent combinations of attitudes.
A paper on deliberation in dynamic games, with Eric Pacuit
This paper explores the (normative) impact of contextual information on agents’ deliberation in dynamic games, drawing on Brian Skyrm’s model of dynamic deliberation. A preliminary version has appeared in the proceeding of LOFT 2018.