A paper on supererogation and dual-role views of reasons
This paper formalizes the core insight of dual-role views on reasons and uses the resulting account to provide a unified and mathematically precise solution to three well-known paradoxes of supererogation
A paper on conflicts involving (moral) rights
The broader context here is the debate between specificationists and generalists about rights. The paper aims to capture the two views in a defeasible logic framework and make progress in adjudicating between them.
R&R / Under review:
A paper on modeling second-order reasons
Second-order reasons are, roughly, considerations that speak in favor of or against taking other considerations to be normative reasons. I don’t think that Horty’s (Reasons as Defaults, 2012) formalization of second-order negative, a.k.a, exclusionary, reasons is faithful to Raz. So this paper (re)captures Raz’s actual view on exclusionary reasons and develops an account of positive second-order reasons.
A paper on the structure of moral principles
This paper uses a defeasible logic framework to explore a number of ways of thinking about moral principles, as well as the connections between these different ways of thinking. A (very) preliminary version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of DEON 2020/21.
A paper on epistemic rules
This paper draws on a defeasible logic to explore two views on epistemic rules and the connections between them. Philosophical issues take central stage.
A paper on the normativity and logic of structural rationality
This one explores how formal tools can be applied in the context of the debate about the normativity of rationality or, roughly, the quest of explaining what’s wrong with having incoherent combinations of attitudes.
A paper on deliberation in dynamic games, with Eric Pacuit
This paper explores the (normative) impact of contextual information on agents’ deliberation in dynamic games, drawing on Brian Skyrm’s model of dynamic deliberation. A preliminary version has appeared in the proceeding of LOFT 2018.
Deontic reasoning on the basis of consistency considerations, with Christian Straßer and Joke Meheus
This piece explores some conflict-tolerant (adaptive) deontic logics. It got an R&R from RSL a number of years back, but never got resubmitted. You can read the paper here.