Under Review / in Preparation

A paper on supererogation and dual-role views of reasons

This paper formalizes the core insight of dual-role views on reasons and uses the resulting account to provide a unified and mathematically precise solution to three well-known paradoxes of supererogation. A preliminary version, focusing on the formal details, has appeared in the proceedings of DEON 2023.

A series of papers exploring reason-based detachment

The philosophical literature often conceives of the interaction between normative reasons by analogy with weight scales. In a series of papers, we construe it as a type of inference pattern, explore it from first principles, and study various extensions and applications. The first paper is forthcoming in the proceedings of LNGAI2023.

A paper on modeling second-order reasons

Second-order reasons are, roughly, considerations that speak in favor of or against taking other considerations to be normative reasons. I don’t think that Horty’s (Reasons as Defaults, 2012) formalization of second-order negative, a.k.a, exclusionary, reasons is faithful to Raz. So this paper (re)captures Raz’s actual view on exclusionary reasons and develops an account of positive second-order reasons.

A paper on epistemic rules

This paper draws on a defeasible logic to explore a number of different views on epistemic rules and the connections between them.

A paper on the structure of moral principles

This paper uses a defeasible logic framework to explore a number of ways of thinking about moral principles, as well as the connections between these different ways of thinking. A (very) preliminary version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of DEON 2020/21.

In hiatus / no longer working:

A paper on deliberation in dynamic games, with Eric Pacuit

This paper explores the (normative) impact of contextual information on agents’ deliberation in dynamic games, drawing on Brian Skyrm’s model of dynamic deliberation. A preliminary version has appeared in the proceeding of LOFT 2018.

Deontic reasoning on the basis of consistency considerations, with Christian Stra├čer and Joke Meheus

This piece explores some conflict-tolerant (adaptive) deontic logics. It got an R&R from the RSL a number of years back, but never got resubmitted. You can read the paper here.